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Under the circumstances defendant's belated criticism cannot now prevail. (People v. Godina, 30 Cal.2d 356, 362 [181
P.2d 881]; People v. Amaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 79 [251 P.2d 324] .)
It may be noted that the trial court in ruling on defendant's
motion for a new trial, specifically found that ''there was no
reversible misconduct on the part of the deputy district attorney nor is there any reason to believe that the jury was
moved by passion and prejudice."
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new
trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, .T., Edmonds, J., Carter, .T., and
Traynor, .T., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring.-Upon the facts of this case I
concur in the judgment and generally in the reasoning leading
to the conclusion.
I do not join in the implied blanket approval of all the
instructions said to have been ''approved in the Tuthill case''
(referring to People v. Tttthill (1947), 31 Cal.2d 92, 99-101
[187 P.2d 16] ).

[L. A. No. 22352.

In Bank.
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CAROL DIE'l'RICH, Respondent, v. NOAH DIETRICH,
Appellant.
[1] Divorce- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-Ordinarily if a ceremonial marriage is shown and if the ceremony
is followed by assumption of marital relations, no further
proof of fact of marriage need be made in preliminary proceedings to sustain an award of temporary alimony, court
costs and attorneys' fees, and an extended inquiry into close
questions as to validity of marriage will not and need not be
allowed in such preliminary proceedings.
[2] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Jurisdiction.-The existence of marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for right of court to order
support, costs and counsel fees pendente lite in action for
[1] See Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 542.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 5-12] Divorce, § 183(2); [2] Divorce, § 178; [4] Divorce, §§ 183(2), 191(5); [13, 15] Divorce,
§307; [14] Marriage, §35; [16] Divorce, §180(1); [17] Divorce,
§ 180; [18] Divorce, § 188.
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divorce or separate maintenance, and the invalidity of the
marriage may be shown at any time.
!d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Even though
defendant in a divorce action denies existence of marriage,
court may make order requiring payment of temporary alimony, costs and attorneys' fees if defendant is given opportunity to be heard and marriage is proved by preponderance of
evidence.
!d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage: Effect of Order.
-Although an order of court requiring payment of temporary
alimony, costs and attorneys' fees implies a finding of existence
of marriage, the proceeding need not be so complete nor evidence so extensive as on trial of issues of case, and the order
therefore does not finally determine those issues nor affect
the final judgment.
!d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-A mere showing that parties to divorce action had once participated in a
marriage ceremony does not absolutely and in all events preclude defendant, on hearing of application for temporary
alimony and suit money, from being heard in challenge of fact
of marriage or from introducing evidence tending to show
invalidity of marriage.
Id.- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-An opportunity "to be heard," with reference to existence of marriage
on hearing of application for temporary alimony and suit
money, means an opportunity to contest.
!d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Since the adverse party in response to an application for temporary support in a divorce action must be given an opportunity to be
heard and to present his evidence although the resulting
judgment is temporary in effect, in any given situation it must
depend on facts of case whether evidence relating to fact of
marriage and, in particular, evidence tending to show that a
ceremonial marriage in fact amounted to no more than a
marriage ceremony, may be properly excluded.
!d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Where, marriage in fact being denied, the affirmative is on party claiming
to be wife to show that an actual marital relation ever existed,
alimony will be denied until that fact is proven to satisfaction
of court or is admitted, since it is on existence of that relation
alone that right to alimony depends.
Id.- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-Where an
actual marital relation has been admitted or shown and its
existence in law is sought to be avoided by some fact set up
by husband, and it devolves on him to show that fact, alimony
will be granted until that fact is shown, since the relation
actually exists on which the right to alimony depends an4
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object of litigation is to annul that actual relation by showing
some other fact, the existence of which is denied.
[10] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-For purposes
of application for temporary alimony there will be no need
that the fact of marriage be so conclusively established as for
purpose of permanent alimony or any other ultimate purpose
of action.
[11] Id.- Temporary Alimony- Proof of Marriage.-It is for
interest of society and in aid of public policy that, where
married relation has been in fact assumed and where it is
averred by putative wife and denied by alleged husband, if
she makes a reasonably plain case of its existence she should
be furnished with means of temporary support and of conducting the suit until truth or falsity of her allegations can
be ascertained by proofs formally taken in case.
[12] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Proof of Marriage.-Where it appears, on hearing of application for temporary alimony and
suit money, that there was a ceremony of marriage coupled
with an actual and bona fide assumption of marital relations,
and where husband, who participated in such ceremony, with
knowledge of circumstances under which wife obtained foreign
divorce decree dissolving a prior marriage, offers proof to
show that his marriage to her was invalid because her previous
divorce was invalid, a ruling excluding such evidence is proper.
[13] !d.-Foreign Divorces-Collateral Attack.-Where husband
against whom wife brought separate maintenance action went
through marriage ceremony with full knowledge of circumstances under which wife obtained a foreign divorce decree
dissolving a prior marriage, husband is estopped to assert invalidity of such decree on hearing of wife's application for
temporary alimony and suit money.
[14] Marriage - Annulment- Prior Existing Marriage.-Where
marriage was contracted in reliance on divorce obtained by
wife from previous husband, public policy requires recognition
of second marriage rather than its annulment on ground of invalidity of divorce decree.
[15] Divorce-Foreign Divorces- Collateral Attack.-Civ. Code,
§ 150.1, declaring that "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this State, if both
parties to the marriage were domiciled in this State at the time
the proceeding for the divorce was commenced," may not be
successfully invoked by second husband who participated in
marriage ceremony with full knowledge of circumstances under
which wife obtained foreign divorce decree from first hus[13] See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 157; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 742 et seq.
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band, since second husband by his conduct with relation to
that decree has no standing to question it.
[16] !d.-Temporary Alimony-Financial Condition of Parties.While a wife is not entitled to temporary alimony when she
has independent income sufficient to enable her to support
herself, husband fails to show that trial court ignored this
rule where monthly amount of award for support is approximately $4,087, where wife offered evidence that amount required was approximately $5,028.85, and where her separate
income is $1,100 monthly.
[17] !d.-Counsel Fees-Circumstances Affecting.-In determining
amount of reasonable counsel fees to be allowed wife in her
separate maintenance action and husband's cross-action for
annulment or divorce, trial court may consider nature of litigation, its complexity, nature and extent of contest, amount
involved, financial circumstances of parties, skill required,
professional standing and reputation of husband's attorneys
and of attorneys selected by wife.
[18] !d.-Counsel Fees-Amount of Allowance.-In wife's action
for separate maintenance wherein husband cross-complained
for annulment or divorce, award to wife of $10,000 as attorneys' fees is not excessive where litigation is complicated and
vigorously contested, the amounts involved are considerable
(according to wife's questionnaire the net worth of community
property exceeds $2,500,000, and according to husband's questionnaire his net worth is $1,014,626), and the standing and
ability of counsel are high.

APPEAL from portions of an order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County allowing alimony, counsel fees and
costs. Orlando H. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed.
Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd Wright and
Charles A. Loring for Appellant.
Jennings & Belcher and Frank B. Belcher for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff Carol Dietrich brought an action
for separate maintenance against her alleged husband, Noah
Dietrich. Noah answered, admitting a "purported marnage
ceremony" but claiming that there was no valid marriage
because at the time of the ceremony Carol was the wife of
another man; i. e., was not validly divorced from a previous
husband. Noah also cross-complained, seeking an annulment,
or, in the alternative, a divorce. Carol obtained an order to
show cause and, after hearing, the trial court ordered, among
other things, that Noah pay $10,000 on account of her attor-
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neys' fees, $2,750 monthly for her support pendente lite, and
certain property taxes and insurance premiums. Noah appeals from those portions of the order. He does not attack
an award of $750 monthly for the support of the three minor
children of himself and Carol.
Noah contends that (1) the trial court erred to his prejudice
in rejecting offered proof intended to show that his marriage
to Carol was invalid because her previous divorce was invalid;
(2) if it is assumed that it had jurisdiction to award temporary support, the trial court erred in fixing the amount of
such award. We have concluded that these contentions are
without merit.
The parties went throug·h a California marriage ceremony
on May 23, 1936, one day after the entry in Nevada of a
decree which recited that Carol was granted a divorce from
Harold Moore. At the hearing on the order to show cause
in the present California divorce proceeding Noah made the
following offer of proof to show that at the time of the California marriage ceremony Carol was not legally divorced
from Moore. Carol accepted Noah's proposal of marriage in
September, 1935, while she was still married to Moore. She
knew that Noah was a legal resident of Texas and she planned
that after she divorced Moore and married Noah she would
leave California and make her home in Texas. On April 4,
1936, Carol and Moore were both legal residents of California.
On that day she went to Nevada for the sole purpose of simulating a residence and obtaining a divorce. During the period
between April 4, 1936, and May 22, 1936, she frequently wrote
to Noah; her letters, among other things, referred to her intention to make Texas her permanent home after their marriage, described her stay in Nevada as a "sojourn," referred
to the obtaining of a divorce as "the purpose of my trip," and
discussed Noah's arrangements for their contemplated honeymoon voyage. During this same period Carol made several
overnight visits to Los Angeles, and on one trip remained in
Los Angeles for more than 24 hours, despite the fact that
before she left California for Nevada she had written Noah
that ''As I understand the Nevada requirements, I couldn't
possibly return here for even a day after establishing my
residence there. . . . It wouldn't do to run any risk of later
having it declared invalid." In obtaining the Nevada decree
Carol used a power of attorney from Moore ; Moore was never
present in Nevada during the period from April 4 to May 22,
1936; and Carol paid all the expenses of the Nevada action.
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Noah also offered to prove that he "learned for the first
time that there was some question regarding the legality of
the Nevada divorce . . . in November, 1951" (Carol instituted this action November 13, 1951) ; however, there is no
question that Noah knew of the above described circumstances
under which Carol obtained the Nevada decree.
The only portion of the offered proof which the trial court
admitted in evidence was an exemplified copy of the judgment
roll of the Nevada action. This copy shows that Moore, by
Nevada counsel, appeared and answered, denying Carol's allegation that she was a bona fide resident of Nevada, and that
the Nevada court found that such allegation was true. The
trial court in the present proceeding rejected the balance of
the offered proof upon three stated grounds: (1) Noah's conduct in connection with Carol's obtaining the Nevada decree
estops him from attacking it. (2) Noah cannot attack the
Nevada decree because he is not a party to or interested in
it. (3) Noah is precluded from attacking the decree by the
full faith and credit clause (U. S. Const., art. IV, § 1).
Carol urges that the evidence was properly excluded for
the reasons stated by the trial court and also urges that, regardless of the correctness of those stated grounds, once a
ceremonial marriage is established then ''in any and all events
under those circumstances she is entitled to alimony pendente
lite.''
[1] It may be stated as a general rule that ordinarily if
a ceremonial marriage is shown, and if the ceremony is followed by the assumption of marital relations, no further proof
of the fact of marriage need be made in preliminary proceedings in order to sustain an award of temporary alimony, court
costs and attorneys' fees, and an extended inquiry into close
questions as to the validity of the marriage will not be, and
need not be, allowed in such preliminary proceedings.
[2] Fundamentally, as declared in Colbert v. Colbert (1946),
28 Cal.2d 276, 279 [169 P.2d 839], "The existence of the
marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the right of the
court to order support, costs, and counsel fees pendente lite
in an action for divorce or separate maintenance. [Citations.]
And the invalidity of the marriage, as is true of any jurisdictional prerequisite, may be shown at any time.'' [3] And
as pointed out in Carbone v. Superior Court (1941), 18 Cal.2d
768, 771-772 [117 P.2d 872, 136 A.L.R. 1260], "Even though
the defendant in an action for divorce denies the existence of
the marriage, the court may nevertheless make the order if
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defendant is given an opportunity to be heard and the marriage is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .
[4] .Although such an order implies a finding of the existence of the relationship, the proceeding need not be so complete nor the evidence so extensive as upon the trial of the
issues of the case and the order therefore does not determine
those issues nor affect the final judgment. [Citations.] "
[5] The above stated general rule does not mean, however,
that the mere showing that the words of a marriage ceremony
have been said, absolutely and in all events precludes a defendant on an order to show cause from being heard in challenge of the fact of marriage. .Absurd results could follow
if we accepted Carol's broad contention that in no event, on
the hearing of an application for temporary alimony and
suit money, can evidence tending to show the invalidity of an
admitted ceremonial marriage be received; for example, a
spouse could be required to pay temporary alimony even
though he or she could show-and offered to show conclusively
-that in the very same court the marriage now relied on had
been previously annulled at the instance of the other spouse
by a judgment which had become final and that such spouse
had remarried. To absolutely exclude such evidence simply
because of the fact that the parties had once participated in
a ceremony of marriage would deny verity to the substance
of the rule, as stated in the Carbone case, that ''Even though
the defendant in an action for divorce denies the existence of
the marriage, the court may nevertheless make the order if
defendant is given an opportunity to be heard and the marriage is proved by a preponderance of the evidence." (Italics
added.) [6] .An opportunity "to be heard" means an opportunity to contest. To give full effect to the rule for which
Carol contends would mean that the opportunity of an adverse
party to be heard would be satisfied and concluded if he or
she were permitted to be present when the one seeking temporary alimony produced an authenticated copy of a recorded
certificate of marriage of the parties. [7] Since, as stated
in the Carbone case, supra (at p. 772 of 18 Cal.2d), the adverse party, in response to an application for temporary support in a paternity or divorce action, ''must be given an opportunity to be heard and to present his evidence . . . [although]
[t]he resulting judgment is temporary in effect," it appears
that in any given situation it must depend on the facts of
the case whether evidence relating to the fact of marriage,
and, in particular, evidence tending to show that a ceremonial
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marriage in fact amounted to no more than a marriage ceremony (i. e., was a mock marriage or, for any conclusive and
readily provable reason was wholly void or had already been
annulled or dissolved) may be properly excluded.
[8] In Bancroft v. Bancroft ( 1935), 9 Cal.App.2d 464,
468 l50 P .2d 465], the District Court of Appeal quoted with
approval from Brinkley v. Brinkley (1872), 50 N.Y. 184, 193
l10 Am.Rep. 460], as follows: " 'And the principle at the
bottom is this: Where, marriage in fact being denied, the
affirmative is upon the party claiming to be the wife 1 to show
that an actual marital relation ever existed, there alimony
will be denied until that fact is proven to the satisfaction of
the court, or is admitted; for it is upon the existence of that
relation alone that the right to alimony depends. [9] Where
an actual marital relation has been admitted or shown. and
its existence in law is sought to be avoided by some fact set
up by the husband, and it devolves upon him to show that
fact, there alimony will be granted until that fact is shown;
for the relation actually exists upon which the right to alimony
depends, and the object of the litigation is to annul that actual
relation by showing some other fact, the existence of which is
denied. [10] It may be said, too, that for the purposes of
~:~n application for temporary alimony there will not be need
that the fact of marriage be so conclusively established as for
the purpose of permanent alimony, or any other ultimate
purpose of the action. [11] It is for the interest of soriety
and in aid of public policy that, where the married relation
has been in fact assumed . . . and where it is avern'd by
the putative wife and denied by the alleged husband. if shr
makes a reasonable plain case of its existence, she should be
furnished with means of temporary support and of conducting
the suit until the truth or falsehood of her allegations can
be ascertained by the proofs formally taken in the case. ' ''
(See, also, 35 Am.Jur. 226, 227, § 70.)
[12] Applying the above stated principles, which we adopt.
to the present case, since it appears that there was a ceremony
of marriage coupled with an actual and bona fide assumption
of marital relations, and considering the character of thP
.attack on the validity of the marriage, it is obvious that the
exclusionary ruling was proper and may be sustained at this
stage of the proceedings on this ground alone.
'In California, since the rights and obligations of husband and wife
are mutual and reciprocal (Civ. Code, § 137), the principles stated apply
interchangeably to either husband or wife as the case may be.
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There is, however, another and more fundamental ground
which not only is controlling at this stage of the proceedings
but presumptively will be controlling on the trial as well.
[13] On this record it is immediately obvious that the very
evidence offered to show the invalidity of the ceremonial marriage was properly excluded because that same evidence shows
that Noah is estopped to assert the claimed invalidity of the
Nevada divorce. With full knowledge of the circumstances
under which that divorce was obtained, and in reliance on
such divorce, Noah went through a marriage ceremony and
lived with Carol as her husband for many years. [14] The
public policy of this state, in the circumstances of this case,
as in those considered in Rediker v. Rediker (1950), 35 Cal.2d
796, 808 [221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152], requires recognition of the second marriage rather than the "dubious attempt
to resurrect the original" marriage. (See, also, Watson v.
Watson (1952), 39 Cal.2d 305, 307 [246 P.2d 19].)
[15] Noah urges that the public policy applicable here
is stated in section 150.1 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be
of no force or effect in this State, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this State at the time the proceeding
for the divorce was commenced.'' But we are not considering
the "force or effect" of the Nevada deer ~e except as such
consideration is necessarily incident to th( !Jlding that Noah,
because of his conduct with relation to tttat decree, has no
standing to question it.
Since we have determined that Noah's offer of proof shows
that he is estopped to question the Nevada decree, it is unnecessary, either in respect to the order directly concerned
or for the guidance of the court at the trial on the merits, to
pass upon the correctness of the other stated grounds of the
trial court's exclusionary ruling.
Noah claims that the amount awarded for support is excessive, beyond his ability to pay, and does not take into account
Carol's separate income. The total annual amount which
Noah is required to pay for support of Carol and the children
(including insurance and county taxes on the home where
Carol and the children live) is $49,030.61. According to the
wife's questionnaire, necessary expenses of herself and the
children are $5,028.85 monthly and her separate income is
$1,100 monthly. There is evidence that these figures are
substantially correct. Noah's net income for 1950, after pay-
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ment of income taxes, was $197,139.32; the expense of maintaining the family, with Noah living in the family home (from
which he has since moved), was $85,567.76. An increase of
about $20,000 in taxes for the year 1951 was expected. According to the husband's questionnaire, his necessary annual
expenses total $14,820.
If the above figures are accepted it appears that Noah
would have the ability to pay the amount awarded. His contention that he did not have such ability is based in part
upon a view of his estimated income less favorable than that
accepted by the trial court and in part upon considering the
award of attorney fees as if it were part of the support award.
[16] Noah is correct in his statement of the proposition
that a wife is not entitled to temporary alimony when she
has independent income sufficient to enable her to support
herself. (Loeb v. Loeb (1948), 84 Cal.App.2d 141, 146 [190
P.2d 246]; Spreckels v. Spreckels (1952), 111 Cal.App.2d
529, 533 [244 P.2d 917].) But he does not show that the trial
court ignored this rule. The monthly amount of the award
for support is approximately $4,087. As stated above, Carol
offered evidence that the amount required was approximately
$5,028.85. Thus the total amount available to her, with her
own separate income of $1,100, is approximately the amount
which she requested and testified that she required. From
this we may assume that the trial court took into account her
separate income when it fixed the amount of the award.
Noah complains that the award of $10,000 on account of
Carol's attorneys' fees was excessive. [17] The situation
is similar to .that in Pope v. Pope (1951), 107 Cal.App.2d
537, 539 [237 P.2d 312] : "In determining the amount of a
reasonable fee the trial court is permitted to consider various
factors: The nature of the litigation, its complexity, the nature
and extent of the contest, the amount involved, the financial
circumstances of the parties, the skill required, the professional
standing and reputation of the husband's attorneys and of
the attorneys selected by the wife, are some of the relevant
matters to be considered. [Citations.] "
[18] Here the litigation is complicated and vigorously
contested; the amounts involved are considerable (according
to the wife's questionnaire the net worth of community property exceeds $2,500,000 ; according to the husband's questionnaire his net worth is $1,014,626); and the standing and
ability of counsel are high.
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For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is
affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
conclusion reached, but dissent from that part of the opinion
which holds that the defendant may not, on the trial of the
case, offer proof of the invalidity of the plaintiff's divorce
from her first husband.
The existence of an estoppel is a question of fact (10 Cal.
Jur., 656; Gump v. Gt~mp, 42 Cal.App.2d 64 [108 P.2d 21];
Assets Corp. v. Perrin Properties, Inc., 48 Cal.App.2d 220
[119 P.2d 375] ; Judelson v. American JJ1etal Bearing Oo., 89
Cal.App.2d 256 [200 P.2d 836]), and the burden of proof
is on the party asserting the doctrine (Garrett v. Cook, 89
Cal.App.2d 98 [200 P.2d 21] ).
The vital principle· of equitable estoppel is that he who by
his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not
otherwise have done shall not subject such person to loss or
injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.
Four things are essential to the application of the doctrine:
(1) The party to be estopzJed must be apprised of the facts;
(2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or
must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right
to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be
ignorant of the true state of facts; ( 4) the other party must
rely upon the conduct to his injury. Defendant's offer of
proof showed that plaintiff went to Nevada for the sole purpose
of obtaining a decree of divorce; that she did not remain in
that state continuously for the six weeks' period of residence
which is the jurisdictional prerequisite demanded by that
forum; that defendant did not know, prior to November, 1951,
of the invalidity of the Nevada judgment of divorce awarded
to plaintiff from her first husband; that there is no evidence
that defendant aided, assisted, or counseled plaintiff to procure a decree of divorce in Nevada. An objection was sustained by the trial court to this offer of proof. Plaintiff
offered no evidence controverting defendant's allegations. It
would appear to me that on the record here the first element
of an estoppel is missing-that the party to be estopped must
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be apprised of the facts-in that defendant did not know of
the invalidity of the Nevada divorce; the second element is
present-defendant married plaintiff intending that his conduct be acted upon; the third element is missing-plaintiff
was not ignorant of the true state of facts; the fourth element
is probably present-plaintiff relied upon the marriage to
defendant although the element of injury is problematical.
Upon the trial, if defendant is permitted to litigate the question, plaintiff will also be permitted to introduce evidence
which may have the effect of supplying the missing elements.
In previous cases where one spouse has been held estopped
from denying the validity of a previous divorce, additional
elements have been present. The estopped spouse has aided,
abetted, counseled, or actively participated by paying the
expenses, etc. in the procurement of the fraudulent divorce.
In Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796, 806 [221 P.2d 1, 20
A.I-'.R.2d 1152], we said "The doctrine of estoppel has also
been held applicable to cases in which a husband sought to
assert the invalidity of his or his wife's earlier divorce from
another as a defense to her action for divorce and alimony.''
Cited as authority are Margulies v. Margttlies, 109 N.J.Eq.
391, 392 [157 A. 676] and VanSlyke v. VanSlyke, 186 Mich.
324, 330 [152 N.W. 921]. Both of these cases held estopped
a spouse who had actively participated in the procurement of
a fraudulent divorce which he later sought to have declared
invalid. I feel, therefore, that under the facts as here presented, this court should not preclude defendant from offering proof at the trial of the invalidity of plaintiff's Nevada
decree of divorce.
While I feel that in view of the services rendered, the
amount awarded is excessive, I do not feel that I should say
that the award of attorneys' fees in this case is an abuse of
discretion.
A ceremonial marriage between plaintiff and defendant
having been established the court could properly exercise its
discretion in making a preliminary award of alimony pendente
lite, attorneys' fees and costs without hearing evidence as to
the invalidity of the marriage, reserving to the trial on its
merits the consideration of such evidence.
I, therefore, concur in the affirmance of the award.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October
22, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

